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Abstract
Online extremism and radicalisation on social media (SM) are significant concerns of governments, SM
companies, and society. The 2021 attack on the US Capitol illustrates the severity of extremism fuelled
through SM communications. The literature suggests the removal of extremist messages from SM to
limit online extremism. However, scholars argue that these interventions are ineffective in containing
the threat of extremist messages on SM. This study draws on dual-process theory and reactance theory
to conceptualize the factors that contribute to limiting online extremism. Our model proposes cognitive
factors and socio-technical factors that impact how SM users respond to online extremist messages. The
model is tested with an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based automated software agents (bots). The research
contributes to a novel understanding of bots as social bots that are programmed as interventions to
extremism.
Keywords Social media communication, social bot, extremism, dual-process theory, reactance theory

1

Australasian Conference on Information Systems
2021, Sydney

Blasiak et al.
Countering Extremism with Social Bots

1 Introduction
The threat to society through extremist messages on social media (SM) is a primary concern for
governments, SM companies, and societies worldwide. Extremists use the SM environment and its
reach to broadcast extremist propaganda. Through this communication, extremists seek to persuade
users to accept violence as a necessary means of bringing about change. These calls for violence are
undemocratic and threaten democratic values. Australia’s Director-General of Security, Mike Burgess,
recently highlighted the importance of online counter-extremism, identifying the threatening online
environment as a key multiplier for extremism (Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 2021).
The literature suggests removing extremist messages from SM to limit online extremism and using
counter-narratives (Winter et al. 2020). However, others have argued that these interventions are inept
and impractical to counter extremist messaging (Reed et al. 2017). Indeed, manual or keyword-based
removal is coarse and lacks contextual focus (Thomas et al. 2021). Moreover, the interventions are often
too slow (Marcellino et al. 2020) to stop the radicalisation process (Youngblood 2020). Moreover,
despite current interventions, extremists successfully target susceptible users with subtle radicalisation
methods that are difficult to identify and thus rarely removed (Marcellino et al. 2020).
The latest research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents social bots as human-designed and developed
software that operates as autonomous agents (Maruping and Matook 2020). Social bots are used on SM
to undertake communicative actions with users based on AI algorithms. For example, these bots are
capable of engaging in dyadic conversations with users (Seering et al. 2019), and like, comment, or
create content independently. These abilities enable them to take on essential roles on SM, such as
content moderator (Seering et al. 2018; Seering et al. 2019), learning facilitator (Winkler and Söllner
2018), and medical assistants (Dennis et al. 2020).
Social bots can be used for interventions with extremist messages on SM. Bots have shown to be efficient
in changing user attitudes (Zarouali et al. 2020) and creating higher persuasiveness due to their nonjudgemental nature (Dennis et al. 2020). Their ability to engage with other users in dyadic conversation
in comments to postings makes them approachable for users (Seering et al. 2019); even in challenging
contexts (Winkler and Söllner 2018). In addition, bots offer scalability, thus having an economic
advantage over human intervention (Mittal et al. 2016).
Research on human thinking suggests that information, as we would find it in messages on SM, is
cognitively processed in two ways: Spontaneously implicit and consciously explicit (Wilson et al. 2000).
Dual-process theory (DPT) theorizes two systems that interact with each other. DPT suggests that these
two systems (System 1 and System 2) are complementary in forming attitudes. The implicit System 1 is
receptive to peripheral cues (e.g., message source, visual cues, and social proof), is fast, and requires
low cognitive effort. In contrast, System 2 is effortful, slow, and detailed in elaborating message content
and context (Kahneman 2011). For instance, messages suggesting a threat are exceptionally efficient in
motivating a more elaborate cognitive response (Boss et al. 2015). Reactance theory (RT) suggests that
these messages can also lead to attitude change (Dillard and Shen 2005).
This research integrates DPT and RT to conceptualise social bots as an effective cognitive intervention
to attitude radicalisation. Current research suggests that deliberate triggering of System 1 and System
2 responses SM is difficult (Moravec et al. 2020). We argue that the dyadic conversation mode and the
overall persuasiveness of social bots make them particularly suitable for deliberately triggering distinct
System 1 and System 2 responses. Moreover, social bot interventions that use fear appeal messages are
arguably particularly suitable to influence attitude change (Boss et al. 2015), foster reactance to
extremist messaging, and thus counter its radicalising effects on the user. To explore this assumption
and test we address the research question of “How can social bots counter extremist messaging?”.
The remainder of the paper discusses the present literature on online radicalisation, shortcomings of
current extremism interventions, and finally, the potential role of social bots in the unique challenge of
interfering with extremist messages in socially complex multiparty online conversations. Furthermore,
we propose an empirical research design applying DPT and RT to test the efficacy of social bot
interventions to extremist messaging.

2 Background
2.1 Online Radicalisation through Extremist Content
Extremists entice users to increasingly support violence based on undemocratic ideologies (Jasko et al.
2017). Radicalisation is a process and draws on three main determinants (3N): first, an individual’s
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need and universal desire for personal significance, second, guiding narratives for the consequent
“quest for significance”, and third, a network that validates the collective narrative that justifies violence
(Kruglanski et al. 2019).
Extremists use different persuasion tactics (Saleh et al. 2021) in their messages to radicalise SM users
and plant attitudes that support the necessity for violence. Extremists apply strategies including
persuasive narratives, appeal to emotion and imagery, and fear to convey an extremist message
(Braddock 2020; Frischlich 2020). These strategies target the three determinants of extremism to
radicalise users and create positive attitudes towards extremist beliefs, behaviours, and emotions
(Schmuck et al. 2020). Content that fosters extremist attitudes is particularly present on popular SM
platforms like YouTube (Schmitt et al. 2018) and Instagram (Frischlich 2020).
Current Shortcomings and Prospects of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) Measures
Content intervention to prevent radicalisation is complex due to online moderation's required scale and
cost (Jee 2020), but more so due to limited theoretical and empirical foundations (Glazzard 2017). CVE
methods like counter-narratives and information campaigns primarily disrupt demand for extremist
content but lack empirical evidence of their efficiency (Reed and Ingram 2018). Academics and civic
organisations frequently challenge current content moderation techniques for opaque moderation
practices (Douek 2020), human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2020), risks of collateral
damage through misclassified content removal (The Economist 2020). Alternative approaches that
mitigate the risk of extremist message exposure, like warning labels, are still scarce and limited in their
effectiveness to prevent radicalisation (Pennycook et al. 2020).
This criticism reveals that CVE measures online cannot rely solely on technical approaches to limiting
the supply of extremist messages. Radicalisation intervention has social components. This includes the
user demand for radical content, the individual context, susceptibility to external intervention (Miron
and Brehm 2006), and the emotional state of users and associated cognitive processes during content
exposure. These components add to the complexity of interventions. Cognitive psychology research
recognises the potential of cognitive interventions to address the shortcomings of technical
interventions (Baugut and Neumann 2020; Nuraniyah 2018). Attitude inoculation to extremist
persuasion messages is an emerging approach to prevent the radicalising effects of extremist online
propaganda (Saleh et al. 2021). Other research explores the preventative effects of visual and textual
cues in other users’ comments and messages and users’ literate ability to process information online
(Vraga et al. 2021). This stream of research holds valuable practical implications for the requirements
of forthcoming CVE intervention methods.
Social Bot Interventions as Opportunity in CVE
Our research focuses on social bots as an intervention approach that seems particularly promising to
actively counter extremist messaging. Bots are automated computer algorithms that produce content
and interact autonomously with human SM users in dyadic conversations (Seering et al. 2019). Social
bots are particularly suitable for changing users’ perceptions, overcoming polarising content bubbles
(Zarouali et al. 2020), and lowering users' threshold for engaging with opposing or conflicting views
(Dingler et al. 2018). Thus, AI bots encourage reflection on held attitudinal positions. These aspects of
AI bots highlight the technology's value to engage in complex cognition processes, such as attitude
changes and radicalisation (Blasiak et al. 2021). The possibility to foster lasting resilience to extremist
online propaganda is currently not addressed by the predominantly retroactive CVE measures online.
Social bots have attributes that make them particularly suitable for content interventions on SM. These
attributes include context and emotional awareness (Winkler and Söllner 2018), the capability of direct
communication with human users, perceived higher persuasiveness (Dennis et al. 2020), and perceived
value neutrality. The latter mitigates some of the complexity of users' intervention susceptibility and
their predisposition to avoid disclosing socially undesirable views to other people (Nadarzynski et al.
2020). In addition, social bots are cost-efficient due to their potential for scalability, thus, having an
economic advantage over human intervention (Mittal et al. 2016). While social bot interventions are
promising and presumably feasible (Marcellino et al. 2020), fundamental deficits in our understanding
of social bots and online interventions prevent their safe use in CVE.

3 Research Design – A Cognitive Perspective on Attitude Change
Based on Moravec et al. (2020) suggestions about how to apply dual-process theory to the design of SM
interventions, our research adopts dual-process theories to understand the effect of social bot
interventions on System 1 versus System 2 cognition and attitude change. Dual-process theories
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propose that people process messages through two fundamentally different cognitive processes
(Kahneman 2011). A primary low effort system 1 that is experiential, associative, and unconscious, and
a separate conscious system 2 (System 2), which is capable of rational thoughts based on high effort
cognition and increased level of message elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
System 1 and System 2 processing are complementary cognitive systems. Low effort System 1 processing
is the default system that occurs first, continuously, and unconsciously. System 1 primarily responds to
visual or peripheral cues (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) and is judgmental, mainly relying on existing
attitudes and beliefs (Moravec et al. 2020). Extremists often exploit this inelaborate, judgmental and
emotional response to induce radicalisation (Braddock 2019; Saleh et al. 2021). In contrast, System 1
may trigger consequent System 2 cognition if sufficiently motivated and cognitively able to spend the
required elaboration effort (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The more effortful and deliberate elaborations
of System 2 (Kahneman 2011) is typically a response to cues picked up by the instinctive System 1. For
instance, fear is a strong motivator (Boss et al. 2015) to assess information more deliberately.
Messages that contain threats and appeal to fear can induce reactance in users. Reactance is the
tendency to respond with anger and counterarguing when exposed to threatening messages (Dillard
and Shen 2005). A message that highlights the extremist threat and consequences to the individual user
may cause anger and counterarguing, triggering user’s reactance and ultimately leads to more resilience
to extremist persuasion (Braddock 2019). This extremist threat resilience and subsequent attitude
change is likely the result of System 2 cognition (Kahneman 2011).
We consider both, dual-process cognition, and reactance to fear-inducing intervention messages. We
presuppose that (H1) there is a relationship between System 1 cues that suggest a threat to users and
subsequent reactance (i.e., feelings of anger and counterarguing). Reactance theory suggests that
threat-induced fear leads to expressions of anger and counterarguing in users, ultimately leading to a
shift in attitude and behaviour (Dillard and Shen 2005). Attitudes form as a result of System 2 (Petty
and Cacioppo 1986). Hence, we propose a relationship between System 2 (fear) appeal messages of
social bot interventions and subsequent attitude change as a response to fear appeal messages (H2).
We propose a research model (Figure 1) that captures dual-process cognitions in System 1 and System
2 as a response to social bot interventions. We observe the attitude-changing qualities of social bot
interventions as a response to exposure to extremist content on SM. The social bot consequently
interferes with the dual-process outcome using peripheral cues (i.e., source credibility, profile
information, social proof) and message attributes that use fear appeal to motivate message engagement,
as well as supplementary information that informs a user’s ability to recognize the threat of extremist
online messages. Hence, we observe potential changes in attitude and user reactance.

Figure 1 Research model to study the social bot interventions to extremist messaging
An attitude is a complex mental state that encompasses beliefs, feelings, values, and dispositions to act
in specific ways and encompasses users' evaluations of ‘objects’ (Chaiken et al. 1995, p. 387). These
objects may be anti-immigration or traditional Western values in the case of Australian extremism. A
change in attitude constitutes a shift in a user’s evaluation of an attitude object featured in the content
on SM. In practice, this could be the level of agreement or disagreement to statements relating to antiimmigration or traditional Western values.
In a dual process, attitude change is subject to how information messages are received and cognitively
processed. Low elaboration of the factual elements of a message is the rudimentary state of message
processing (Kahneman 2011), moderated by peripheral cues associated with, for instance: source
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credibility of the bot and visual cues: bot-name, avatar, and bot details (i.e., social proof) (Petty and
Cacioppo 1986). Most users on SM are in a hedonic mindset. Consequently, users are reluctant to more
deliberate and effortful processing (Moravec et al. 2020) because it requires more cognitive load and
increased elaboration activity. For effortful processing in system 2 to occur, a potential intervention
needs to motivate the user to undertake the more effortful evaluation (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
Furthermore, cognitive biases, including conformity and confirmation biases, influence attitudechanging qualities of a message (Kahneman 2011) that evokes a system 2 response.

4 Research Method
To test how specific social bot attributes can influence attitude change and trigger user reactance to
combat extremist messages, we propose a qualitative pilot study to inform a between-subjects 2 x 3
factorial experiment. Different social bot peripheral cues and message attributes are included.
In a pilot study, we initially test the efficacy of social bot interventions by assessing participant
responses to a structured interview. We will also interview users of online groups that are associated
with far-right sentiment and attitude objects (i.e., anti-immigration, discrimination of minorities) to
ensure attitude variation. We ask participants about their trust in government intervention versus
platform provider intervention using social bots and test the design of our subsequent online
experiment intervention design.
In the main experiment, we present participants with public SM posts containing conservative views on
far-right attitude objects. The comment section of the posts will be visible to the participants. Within
the comment section, comments by other users and intervention messages identifiable as social bots
through their account attributes: account name, avatar, and profile page will be visible and constitute
our treatments. The messages commented by social bots aim to increase user awareness of the threats
of extremist content. Our interventions aim to trigger System 1 and System 2 processing, observing
potential differences in attitude change between respondents.
A Likert scale survey is used to determine user attitudes pre-and post- interventions. Similarly, we will
assess anger and counterarguing to observe reactance (Dillard and Shen 2005).

5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our research builds on previous work in the field of AI. Our contribution is to introduce social bots as
dual-process interventions to the CVE context while considering the efficacy of specific social bots
attributes in intervening with extremist propaganda and user attitudes. We follow recent calls to action
(Moravec et al. 2020) and contribute to SM intervention research by applying System 1 and System 2
processing, identifying potential mechanisms to trigger System 1 or System 2 cognition in users
deliberately. Theoretical insights into how intervention mechanisms and cues can be used to
deliberately trigger attitude change and reactance in users are invaluable to the design of interventions.
We call for interventions that go beyond the technical removal of dangerous content and rather foster
more cautious and deliberative user engagement with content online. Thus, it is crucial to understand
the specific effects of intervention cues on a user’s cognition on SM. These findings' implications go
beyond the extremism context and, for instance, may apply to IS security research and the design of
interventions to phishing messages.
Government agencies and tech companies worldwide are highly interested in interventions against
online radicalisation and the prevention of extremism, even more so considering recent events. In our
empirical study, we propose social bots as a scalable, fast, and economical alternative to current
radicalisation intervention. We hope that the results of our research contribute to safer online
environments and stimulate more explorative research that addresses current challenges in the design
of our SM landscape. We anticipate that future research will consider the ethics of live implementation
of interventive bots on SM and potential inter-user effects of social bot exposure.
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